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Abstract
Data on 2,355 married women from the 2006 China Health and Nutrition Survey are
used to study how female employment affects fertility in China. China has deep
concerns with both population size and female employment, so the relationship
between the two should be better understood. Causality flows in both directions;
hence, we use a plausible instrumental variable to isolate the effect of employment on
fertility. Female employment reduces a married woman’s preferred number of children
by 0.35 on average and her actual number by 0.50. Ramifications for China’s one-child
policy are discussed.
JEL codes: J13; J18; O15
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1. Introduction
Seminal contributions to the economic theory of the household show that fertility and
job market behavior are interrelated choices, since both strongly affect household time
allocation (Becker 1960, 1965; Mincer 1962; and Willis 1973). The global fall in fertility
and increase in female labor-force participation over the past century might plausibly
represent a single causal process of demographic transition, as posited by Soares and
Falcao (2008)
1. These two sets of theories support a link between female labor force
participation and fertility decisions, with causality flowing in both directions.
Several empirical studies confirm these predictions (see for example, Killingsworth and
Heckman 1986; Angrist and Evans 1998; Kalwij 2000; and Lehr 2009). Better labor-force
opportunities for women appear to have played a role in the historic reductions in fertility
that defined the demographic transition that swept Europe and the United States from the
1800 s to the early 20th century (Guinnane 2011). By increasing the opportunity costs of
childbearing, locally available industrial employment opportunities (such as the opening of
a nearby textile factory) reduced marital fertility by small but significant amounts (Schultz
1985; Crafts 1989; Brown and Guinnane 2002). The study of such transitions in developing
countries remains limited, however.
China is a particularly important place to study the relationship between women’s
employment and fertility, given its rapid pace of economic development, enormous
population, and controversial family planning policies. With more than 1.3 billion
people in 2010, China is the most populous nation in the world (Peng 2011). For the
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initiated in 1979, limits most urban couples to precisely that, and constrains most rural
couples to no more than two children, or one son (Peng 2011). Although fertility rates
had already begun to decline steeply before this policy was introduced, the one-child
policy appears to have substantially reduced fertility rates and population growth
(Banister 1987; Wang 2011; and Peng 2011)
2.
Our analysis uses 2006 data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey to assess
how female employment affects fertility in China. A major challenge in inferring the
effect of female employment on fertility is the reverse causal flow, noted above. To
overcome this endogeneity problem, we employ an instrumental variable that facilitates
access to employment opportunities - the availability of a bus stop in the residence
community – to estimate female employment status. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to analyze the causal effects of female employment on fertility behavior
using data from China
3.
We study fertility preferences and actual fertility, and find that off-farm employment
significantly reduces both. Controlling for endogeneity increases the estimated effect of
female employment status on fertility. Our preferred specification indicates that female
employment reduces the preferred number of children by 0.35 on average, and the
actual number of children by 0.50. Having a first child who is a son is associated with
lower fertility, both preferred and actual.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information
about China’s population control policy, and Section 3 presents a simple conceptual
framework. Data and variables are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents our
estimation strategy, and Section 6 shows the results. Section 7 summarizes our findings
and discusses their policy implications.
2. China’s population control policies
Due to its huge population, China has employed various population control policies for the
past 40 years. In 1971, when the population was more than 800 million, China integrated
population control into its national economic development plan. In 1973, the central
government started the “Later, Longer, and Fewer” family-planning campaign to encourage
later marriage, longer intervals between births, and fewer children. In 1978, China encour-
aged couples to have only one child, and set the maximum at two. It also added family
planning to its constitution. The next year China’s State Council began implementing the so
called “one-child policy” through the family planning administration, emphasizing
population control as a strategic requirement for China’s development.
Although China’s policy is called the one-child policy, many couples are allowed to
have more than a single child (Peng 2011). Most ethnic minorities (that is, non-Han
ethnic Chinese) are permitted to have more than one child. In rural areas, a couple
may usually have a second child if the first child is a girl or is disabled. To implement
the restrictions on childbearing, local governments provide financial subsidies to
families with one child, and impose substantial penalties if a couple violates the population
control policies by having an “out of quota” birth
4.
There are several reasons why enforcement of a strict one-child policy has been difficult
in China. Children – especially sons – are valued for contributing to farm labor
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since social security and pension systems in China are both recent and limited.
The one-child policy is also often linked to the increase in China’s unbalanced sex
ratio, enabled by ultrasound technology that permits sex-selective abortion
5.O u r
study focuses on how female employment affects fertility in China. If employment
reduces fertility, encouraging female employment could be an alternative tool for
limiting population growth in China.
3. Conceptual framework
Consider a simple model of a woman with opportunities for off-farm employment.
How do those opportunities affect the number of children she desires? We posit a
utility function for a united household – woman and husband – but for ease of exposition,
speak of the woman as the decision-maker. She values consumption, c, leisure, d,a n d
children. Her utility function is
Uc ;d;n ðÞ ¼ uc ðÞþvd ðÞ þ nw n ðÞ ;
where n is the number of children. There are diminishing returns to each argument. To
simplify, we assume that household income apart from her earnings are Y,a n dt h a t
off-farm employment requires a time commitment of K hours per week, and that care of
each child requires h hours per week. All income goes into consumption, and any time
not spent raising children or working (and commuting to work) goes into leisure.
Women differ along two dimensions: preference for children, and opportunities for
off-farm employment. Utility from children is non-linear: w(n)=ba
n− 1, with 0 <a<1
common to all women. To capture differences in fertility preferences, we assume a
distribution of the “taste for children” parameter, b. Differences in off-farm employment
opportunities is represented by the distribution of the off-farm employment salary, s.
Three facts should be evident: 1. women offered a higher salary are more likely to
accept employment; 2. women with a greater taste for children will desire more children
and will require a higher wage before they work; and 3. among women with the
same taste for children, women who are employed, having less time to allocate,
will prefer fewer children
6.
Let Iw be the indicator for whether a woman chooses to work off the farm. The
women’s optimization problem is
max
c;d;n;IW
Uc ;d;n ðÞ s:t:IW K−t ðÞ þ nh þ d≤168 and c≤Y þ IW s ðÞ ;
where t =0 with no bus stop and t >0 with a bus stop (i.e., access to a bus stop saves
travel time to employment and thus reduces the time commitment of an off-farm job).
For our simulation, we assume u(c)=ln(c) and v(d) =ln(d). Solving for c and d and
substituting, we find that a woman’s optimization problem becomes
max
n;IW
ln Y þ IW s ðÞ ðÞ þ ln 168−IW K−t ðÞ −nh ðÞ þ nban−1:
The distribution of taste for children and opportunities for employment will determine
how many women choose employment and how many children employed and
unemployed women will prefer. The parameters in our simulation of the model
(results shown in Figure 1) are as follows: Y=50, K=60, a =0.7, h=20; s ranges
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such that they form a uniform sampling distribution between the limits given.
These parameter values were selected with two considerations: simplicity and their
ability to approximate actual fertility results. Drawing on our empirical data, we
assume that 815 women reside in communities with no bus stop (t=0), and 1540
have access to a bus stop (t=7).
Figure 1 shows the number of children a woman will want as a function of the
offered salary and her taste for children. The figure shows cut-off ranges for the
preferred number of children in whole numbers (i.e., one or two children). For any
given b (the preference parameter for children), there is a minimum salary offer
above which a woman will accept off-farm employment. Having access to a bus
stop shifts down the off-farm employment threshold, as shown in the shaded area
of Figure 1. For women in the intermediate range of taste for children, there is an
upward-sloping threshold for employment, indicating that they must be offered a
higher salary to accept employment (to compensate for the opportunity cost of lost
time to care for children). When these women have access to a bus stop, they
change from n*=2 to n*=1: employment reduces preferred fertility. Those with
the highest taste for children prefer to have more than one child, whether or not
they work.
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Figure 1 Simulation model of preferred number of children.
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off the farm. The preferred number of children among those who choose employment
(1.46) is significantly less than among those who do not (1.84). As surmised, access to a
bus stop increases the percentage of women who choose employment off the farm
(from 26% in non-bus-stop communities to 40% for bus stop communities). In other
words, where salary opportunities are poor, only 26% of women accept off-farm
employment, but in communities with good salary opportunities, 40% accept employment.
The presence of a bus stop, by lowering travel time to higher-salary jobs, encourages more
women to seek off-farm employment. Those who are employed include women from the
higher tail of the child-preference distribution, and therefore the average number of
preferred children among working mothers is higher in the bus stop communities (1.50)
than it is in non-bus-stop communities (1.36)
7.
This model is consistent with what we find in our empirical work below: where
opportunities for better-paid off-farm employment are greater, significantly more
women accept employment; and regardless of location, employed women prefer fewer
children (and are more likely to prefer only one child), compared to women who do
not work off the farm.
4. Data and variables
4.1 Data
We utilize 2006 data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which is
maintained at the Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. The CHNS is an ongoing international collaborative project by the
Carolina Population Center and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at
the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The CHNS was developed to
promote the study of social and economic changes in Chinese society on health and
nutrition. It was fielded by an international team of researchers whose backgrounds
include nutrition, public health, economics, sociology, Chinese studies, and demography.
Our study uses the 2006 wave of data, including 11,739 respondents.
Mainland China consists of 32 province-level administrative units. The CHNS data
were collected from 9 provinces which account for 44 percent of the Chinese population
in 2007: Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and
Guizhou. These 9 provinces vary substantially in geography, economic development,
public resources, and health indicators, with greater wealth and development in the east.
Heilongjiang and Liaoning are two heavily-industrialized provinces in northeastern China.
Jiangsu and Shandong are two industrialized provinces in eastern China. Henan, Hubei,
and Hunan are three agricultural provinces in central China, and Guangxi and Guizhou
are relatively underdeveloped southwestern provinces.
The CHNS employed sophisticated sampling techniques. A multistage, random clus-
ter process was used to draw the sample surveyed in each of the provinces. Counties in
the 9 provinces were stratified by income (low, middle, and high) and a weighted sam-
pling approach was used to randomly select 4 counties within each province. In
addition, the provincial capital and a lower income city were selected when feasible.
Villages within the counties, and urban and suburban neighborhoods within the cities,
were selected at random. The CHNS has a community survey that accompanies each
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Communities are defined as rural villages and urban neighborhoods.
Because our study focuses on the fertility preferences of married women in China
and also uses actual fertility as a robustness check, only respondents who are married,
widowed, or divorced, and under age 52 in 2006 are included, resulting in a sample of
2,355 adult female respondents. The CHNS fertility preference questionnaire is not
asked of women who were never married, or who are 52 years old or older. Since the
official retirement age for women in China is 55, having to confine our sample to
women less than 52 years of age nevertheless allows us to analyze virtually all women
with the potential to be in the formal labor force.
4.2 Variables
Two fertility variables are employed. The first measures fertility preference as the
number of children that a woman says she would prefer to have. The second variable
measures actual fertility as the number of surviving children of an ever-married
female
8. Both fertility variables are count measures. To obtain information on fertility
preferences, the CHNS questionnaire asked “if you could choose the number of children
to have, how many more children would you want to have?” Thus, the preferred number
equals the actual number of children plus the number of additional children that a woman
would like to have. While it is conceivable that some women may prefer fewer children
than they currently have, we believe that the effect of this on fertility is extremely low in
China for several reasons. Ample evidence suggests that Chinese women have low-cost
access to fertility control, so would not give birth to more children than they prefer
9;
challenges in implementing the one-child policy reveal that it suppresses fertility below
the preferred level; children remain highly valued for old-age support, especially in rural
areas; and couples without children are often discriminated against in China, because
people believe that they have a physical disability (infertility). Given the valuable economic
role of children (especially sons, but increasingly daughters as well
10), and the fertility
constraints imposed by the state, most women would prefer at least as many children as
they have
11.
This study uses a binary variable indicating whether the respondent has a job off the
farm to measure female employment status. Each respondent is asked “are you
presently working?” If the answer is yes, the respondent is further asked “what is your
primary occupation?” The employment variable equals 1 if a woman is presently working
and her primary occupation is not farmer, fisherman, or hunter; and equals 0 otherwise.
Almost all the rural households have farming lands assigned by the local government, so
they can potentially work on their land if they do not have off-farm jobs. Working as a
farmer, fisherman, or hunter (the majority are farmers) still provides considerable time
and flexibility for women to combine childcare with work, so we include these
occupations in the sample not employed off the farm. Employment in this paper is thus
defined as off-farm employment. Our hypothesis is that the cost of having more children
is higher for women employed off the farm than for those not so employed.
All the employed females in our sample have formal employment, and their occupations
fall into the following categories: senior professional/technical worker (doctor, professor,
lawyer, architect, engineer), junior professional/technical worker (midwife, nurse, teacher,
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section chief, department or bureau director, administrative cadre, village leader),
administrative staff (secretary, office helper), skilled worker (foreman, group leader,
craftsman), non-skilled worker (ordinary laborer, logger), army officer, police officer,
ordinary soldier, policeman, driver, athlete, actor, musician, and service worker
(housekeeper, cook, waiter, doorkeeper, hairdresser, salesperson, launderer, child
care worker). Virtually all of these occupations require a formal employment relationship.
Thus, informal employment has been excluded from the employed sample. Farmers and
other informal employees (such as part-time employees) are treated as part of the
non-employed sample.
4.2.1 Instrumental variables
In assessing how off-farm employment for women affects fertility in China, a central
challenge is that employment is likely to be endogenous for two reasons: unobservable
factors and simultaneity (reverse causality) (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 50-51). Factors not
observable to researchers or omitted in the estimation, such as employment opportunities,
the cost of raising a child, and the income effects of employment, are correlated with
female employment status and may also affect fertility. The number of children a woman
has, and intends to have, also affects her ability and desire to work, as our conceptual
framework shows. Such reverse causality produces a simultaneity problem. Indeed, the
number of children has long been recognized in the labor economics literature as an
important factor affecting female labor supply (Killingworth and Heckman 1986; Angrist
and Evans 1998).
We apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach to help control for these endogeneity
concerns. To be effective, our IV must be correlated with the endogenous variable – off-
farm employment – but should not directly affect fertility after controlling for a woman’s
employment status. Our instrumental variable is whether there is a bus stop in the village
or urban neighborhood where the woman resides. A bus stop will enable women to
work in other villages or towns, thereby boosting their job opportunities. Bus stops
are particularly important in China, since transportation options are limited and
poor people must rely upon public transportation. Data for this instrumental variable are
taken from the CHNS 2006 Community Survey (supplement to the CHNS 2006), and are
reported by the community (village/neighborhood) heads or cadres instead of the
household survey respondents.
Our conceptual model shows one way in which access to a bus stop could potentially
affect fertility directly, by saving time in commuting to work for women who would
prefer to have more children. We believe that bus stops may potentially affect fertility
choices even if we control for employment, but the effect should be small. In our
sample, preferred fertility is very close for employed women with and without bus stops.
Empirically, when we run the two stage least squares estimation (reported below), the first
stage results show that bus stops can be excluded (by the exclusion test) once we control
for employment status.
A review of policy documents suggests that the set-up of bus stops is largely determined
by government administrative needs, population size, and road infrastructure. Bus stops
have proliferated more quickly in urban areas, but by 2006 they had also developed
extensively in rural areas. Because good transportation can enhance economic development,
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down to the village and neighborhood levels.
The administration system in rural China includes county, township, and administrative
villages. One county (xian) includes several townships (xiang), and one township includes
several administrative villages (xingzheng cun). The administrative village is the lowest
administration or government level in China, and may cover several natural villages
(ziran cun). An administration village is often the largest natural village among several
neighboring natural villages. Policies have subsidized standard roads (gong lu)t ov a r i o u s
villages and neighborhoods. Bus stops are usually set up first in counties and townships, and
later are extended to each administrative village and large natural villages.
A l t h o u g hw ec a n n o tc o m p l e t e l yr u l eo u tt h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tb u ss t o p sa r es e tu p
partly in response to demand for female employment, we think that this is highly
unlikely, and we show that in our data bus stops do not affect fertility directly
after controlling for female employment status.
The estimated average treatment effect will be biased if the subjects who are influenced
by the instruments do not represent the overall population (Imbens and Angrist 1994).
This would occur, for example, if the instruments applied to only a small subset of the
sample, e.g., a very small percentage of households own a private car. But the IV used in
this study affects a wide range of the observations in our study sample, not simply a small
subset: 60 percent of unemployed women and 75 percent of employed women in our
sample have access to a bus stop in their villages/neighborhoods
12. This sizable prevalence
will ensure that our estimates are close to the true average treatment effect
13.
Our IV is constructed from data in the 2006 CHNS community survey, the same
year as the CHNS survey data for female employment and fertility. Results are very
similar when we use bus stop information from the 2000 or 2004 CHNS community
survey data
14.
4.2.2 Other explanatory variables
Our multivariate estimates control for other explanatory variables that may affect fertility.
Household income has been found to positively affect fertility in China, so we include a
measure of total household income
15. Ethnic minorities in China are often allowed to
have more than one child, so we include a binary variable indicating minority status
(of the wife and/or husband). Because a strong preference for sons is still apparent in
China (e.g., Coale and Banister 1996; Li et al. 2010), we also include a binary variable
indicating whether the first child is a son. We expect that women who already have a son
as the first child will have or prefer to have fewer children than those who do not.
The socio-demographic factors we adjust for include: age, educational attainment
(less than primary school, primary school, lower middle school, upper middle school,
technical school, and college), current marital status (married and widowed/divorced),
and province of residence. (Heilongjiang serves as the reference province). Including
the province where the respondent resides further controls for unobserved environmental
or cultural characteristics that may be correlated with female employment and fertility.
We also control for smoking and alcohol consumption status. Smoking may lead
to infertility (Howe et al. 1985; and Bolumar et al. 1996). Alcohol consumption
may indicate an individual’s addictive traits and responsibility level, which may influence
fertility. Alcohol consumption also often complements smoking.
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density, population control policies implemented in the communities (i.e., whether a couple
of Han ethnicity is allowed to have two children if the first child is a girl, and whether a
couple receives a subsidy if having only one child), and urban or rural location.
5. Estimation strategy
Our fertility measures are
Fp =preferred number of children, and
Fa=actual number of children.
Both measures are estimated using the same empirical model, which assumes that
fertility is a function of female employment and other explanatory variables:
Fi ¼ β0 þ Xβ1 þ Eβ2 þ ε; ð1Þ
where
Fi= fertility measure, i =p or a;
X= a vector of other explanatory variables;
E =a binary indicator of whether the woman is employed in an off-farm job;
β0 - β2 =coefficients to be estimated; and
ε =the disturbance term.
The key coefficient of interest is β2, the effect of female off-farm employment on
fertility. The previous literature has employed ordinary least squares (OLS) (Zhang 1990)
and count variable estimation (Poisson) (Schultz 1988) to estimate Equation (1). Given
that fertility measures are count variables, Poisson estimation seems more appropriate.
As discussed above, we employ instrumental variables to overcome endogeneity bias. A
two-stage least squares estimation is implemented. The first-stage regression model is:
E ¼ α0 þ Xα1 þ IVα2 þ u; ð2Þ
where
IV =instrumental variable;
α0 – α2=coefficients to be estimated; and
u=the disturbance term.
Equation (2) will be estimated by OLS estimation at the first stage in the two-stage
least squares model. Traditional two-stage least squares estimation assumes that both
the fertility measures and the employment measure are continuous, but in this context
obviously they are not. The fertility measure is a count variable, while our employment
measure is binary. Therefore, OLS and two-stage least squares are unlikely to provide
efficient estimates of the effect of female employment status on fertility. Thus, after
presenting traditional results for ordinary and two-stage least squares, we turn to a
Poisson estimation procedure. We do so first without correcting for endogeneity, and
then present a two-stage Poisson estimation that corrects for endogeneity.
Unfortunately, it is not feasible to replace the employment status measure with its
predicted value from the first stage in the two-stage Poisson model (Terza et al. 2008).
Therefore, for our Poisson results we use two-stage residual inclusion estimation
(Terza et al. 2008), which is equivalent to control function estimation (Rivers and
Vuong 1988; and Smith and Blundell 1986). The first stage of this two-stage
residual inclusion estimation is similar to that in Equation (2). That gives us the
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nature of female employment status, our model in the first stage will be a Probit
estimation to obtain the generalized residual (Gourieroux et al. 1987). Then we insert this
generalized residual from the first stage, namely û, into Equation (1) as follows:
F ¼ β0 þ Xβ1 þ Eβ2 þ ^ uβ3 þ ε: ð3Þ
If the coefficient on û proves to be statistically significant, that indicates that female
employment status is endogenous (Rivers and Vuong 1988; Smith and Blundell 1986;
and Terza et al. 2008) conditional on the validity of our instrumental variable. The
endogeneity-corrected coefficient β2 in Equation (3) provides an unbiased estimate
of the effect of female employment status on fertility (Terza et al. 2008). Due to
the two-stage feature of this approach, the estimated standard errors in Equation
(3) are underestimated (Terza et al. 2008). Thus, we employ bootstrapping techniques
with 1,000 replications to obtain the corrected standard errors.
6. Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Our study sample in 2006 includes 2,355 ever-married women between 20 and 52 years
old
16. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics by female employment status. In our sample,
35.71 percent (841 women) are employed in full-time or part-time off-farm jobs. This
employment rate is consistent with previous studies
17. A woman who is not employed
would prefer to have 1.768 children on average, while an employed woman would
prefer 1.378 children, a difference of 0.380 children. On average, a woman who is not
employed has 1.650 children and an employed woman has 1.202 children, a difference
of 0.448 children. Thus, when comparing employed and unemployed women, differences
in the preferred number of children are close to but smaller than those in the actual
number of children
18.
Among women not employed in off-farm jobs, 60.2 percent have access to a bus stop
in their own village or neighborhood; this percent rises to 74.7 for the employed
sample. Thus, having a bus stop nearby is positively correlated with female employment
status, suggesting that our instrumental variable has potential.
Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for the other explanatory variables by
employment status. Compared to women who work at home, employed women have
higher household income, are less likely to be minority, are more likely to have a son as
the first child, are less likely to smoke but more likely to drink alcohol, are more likely
to have health insurance, have more education, and enjoy better health status. The
average age of a woman who works at home is 40.5, and that of employed women is
39. This slight gap in ages cannot explain the substantial differences in fertility between
these two groups.
Table 2 shows the fertility measures by female employment status. Compared to their
employed counterparts in both urban and rural areas, women who are not employed
off the farm have more children, prefer to have more children, and are more likely to
have or prefer to have more than one child. Specifically, among women who are not
employed off the farm, 3.369 percent prefer no children and 33.157 percent prefer only
one child. Thus, approximately 63 percent of women who are not employed prefer
more than one child, and 56 percent of them have more than one child. In contrast,
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Variables Mean
1
Employment status
2 Not employed Employed
Sample size N=1514 N= 841
Fertility variables
Preferred number of children 1.768 (0.816) 1.378 (0.695)
Actual number of children 1.650 (0.803) 1.202 (0.632)
Instrumental variables
3
A bus stop in the village or neighborhood 0.602 0.747
Other explanatory variables
Household annual income (RMB) 18408.270 (26224.350) 31250.620 (32105.140)
Ethnic minority (wife and/or husband) 0.156 0.102
Age 40.546 (7.679) 38.960 (7.310)
Married 0.982 0.967
The first child is a son 0.463 0.477
Wife has siblings 0.967 0.956
Husband has siblings 0.930 0.888
Smoking 0.024 0.004
Drinking alcohol 0.069 0.124
Health insurance 0.452 0.591
Education
Less than primary school 0.203 0.050
Primary school 0.235 0.096
Lower middle school 0.409 0.380
Upper middle school 0.126 0.168
Technical school 0.023 0.164
College 0.003 0.141
Occupation
Worker N/A 0.585
Professional N/A 0.166
Manager N/A 0.040
Staff N/A 0.130
Other occupations N/A 0.078
Health status
Excellent 0.119 0.180
Good 0.542 0.522
Fair 0.283 0.282
Poor 0.057 0.017
Village or neighborhood population (in 1000) 3.188 (4.106) 5.540 (8.125)
Han nationality allowed to have two children
if the first child is female
0.469 0.233
Receiving a subsidy if having one child 0.668 0.705
Urban 0.050 0.439
Province
Heilongjiang 0.147 0.112
Liaoning 0.116 0.136
Fang et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 11 of 25 2013, 2:12
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percent of these women do have more than one child. We should stress that we expect
preferred fertility to exceed actual fertility for at least two reasons: some women are young
and still in their child-bearing years, and some may prefer more children than allowed.
6.2 OLS and two-stage least squares estimation
Table 3 presents the results using OLS estimation, thus not controlling for endogeneity.
On average, female employment reduces the preferred number of children by 0.07 and
the actual number of children by 0.12. The coefficient on female employment status in
the preferred fertility regression is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and is
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (Continued)
Jiangsu 0.075 0.149
Shandong 0.079 0.131
Henan 0.143 0.069
Hubei 0.104 0.102
Hunan 0.131 0.067
Guangxi 0.101 0.128
Guizhou 0.106 0.107
Data source: China Health and Nutrition Survey 2006.
N/A not applicable.
1 Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for continuous variables.
2 Employment status is defined by whether an individual has a job off the farm.
3 Instrumental variables are from China Health and Nutrition Survey Community Questionnaire 2006.
Table 2 Preferred and actual fertility in China, by woman’s employment status, 2006
Preferred number of
children
Not employed Employed
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 51 3.369 31 3.686
1 502 33.157 524 62.307
2 756 49.934 230 27.348
3 172 11.361 51 6.064
4 20 1.321 4 0.476
5 11 0.727 0 0.000
6 2 0.132 1 0.119
Total 1514 100.000 841 100.000
Actual number of children
Not employed Employed
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 67 4.425 57 6.778
1 600 39.630 591 70.273
2 678 44.782 165 19.620
3 143 9.445 24 2.854
4 17 1.123 3 0.357
5 9 0.594 0 0.000
6 0 0.000 1 0.119
Total 1514 100.000 841 100.000
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Variables Ordinary least squares estimation
(coefficient)
Preferred number
of children
Actual number
of children
Female employment status
Not employed (reference)
Employed −0.070 (0.042)* −0.120 (0.038)***
Other explanatory variables
Household annual income in natural log 0.014 (0.008)* 0.011 (0.006)*
Ethnic minority (wife and/or husband) 0.012 (0.053) 0.050 (0.048)
Age −0.009 (0.020) 0.084 (0.016)***
Age squared 0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.0002)***
Married 0.087 (0.146) 0.127 (0.129)
The first child is a son −0.117 (0.028)*** −0.102 (0.026)***
Wife has siblings 0.048 (0.077) 0.035 (0.075)
Husband has siblings 0.056 (0.070) 0.020 (0.063)
Smoking −0.089 (0.129) −0.057 (0.125)
Drinking alcohol 0.088 (0.051)* 0.030 (0.046)
Health insurance 0.064 (0.033)** 0.041 (0.031)
Education
Less than primary school (reference)
Primary school −0.140 (0.060)** −0.138 (0.057)**
Lower middle school −0.220 (0.054)*** −0.209 (0.051)***
Upper middle school −0.330 (0.061)*** −0.322 (0.058)***
Technologic school −0.430 (0.078)*** −0.352 (0.067)***
College −0.344 (0.090)*** −0.325 (0.074)***
Occupation
Worker (reference)
Professional −0.058 (0.071) −0.018 (0.058)
Manager −0.099 (0.101) −0.044 (0.086)
Staff −0.031 (0.073) 0.013 (0.058)
Other occupations −0.038 (0.087) 0.007 (0.078)
Health status
Excellent (reference)
Good 0.020 (0.040) −0.039 (0.037)
Fair 0.016 (0.048) −0.053 (0.043)
Poor −0.029 (0.076) −0.054 (0.076)
Province
Heilongjiang (reference)
Liaoning 0.140 (0.049)*** 0.112 (0.044)***
Jiangsu 0.028 (0.054) 0.002 (0.049)
Shandong 0.127 (0.058)** 0.044 (0.053)
Henan 0.553 (0.055)*** 0.473 (0.051)***
Hubei 0.290 (0.058)*** 0.249 (0.051)***
Hunan 0.391 (0.060)*** 0.215 (0.051)***
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effects of employment on fertility are somewhat smaller than those found in Table 1,
possibly reflecting the endogeneity problems that the OLS approach encounters. Our
results are consistent with the finding of Scotese and Wang (1995) that female employment
significantly reduces fertility, although those authors do not control for the endogeneity of
employment. The adjusted R squared of the OLS model is about 0.24 for the preferred
fertility estimation and 0.32 for the actual fertility estimation.
Table 4 shows the results from the first-stage regressions predicting employment status
(both OLS and probit) using our IV estimation approach. The instrumental variable (a bus
stop in the community) proves to be positively and significantly related to female employ-
ment at the 1 percent level in both the OLS and probit estimations. Table 4 also reports
various tests for the instrumental variable obtained from the two-stage least squares
estimation using the preferred number of children as the dependent variable, including tests
of excluded instruments, under-identification tests, and weak instrument-robust inference
tests. Each of these tests is highly significant. For example, the F statistic of the weak
identification test is 22.52, which is significant at the 1 percent level and indicates that the
IV is not weak in the first stage estimation and affects employment status. The IV can be
excluded from the fertility equation, meaning that availability of a bus stop does not affect
fertility directly after controlling for female employment status. However, the endogeneity
test by Wu-Hausman F statistic has a p value of 0.17, even if our instrument for correcting
endogeneity is valid. This insignificance may reflect that fertility measures are count
variables and two-stage least squares estimation may not be appropriate.
Table 5 reports the second-stage estimation results by two-stage least squares after
controlling for endogeneity. We find that the coefficients on female employment status
remain negative, and are statistically significant. In addition, the absolute values of
coefficients increase, suggesting that OLS estimation underestimates the negative
effects of female employment on fertility.
6.3 Poisson estimation
Tables 6 and 7 show the estimated coefficients from the Poisson estimation. After
correcting the endogeneity by the two-stage method in Table 7, the coefficient of
female employment remains negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level
for the preferred fertility regression and at the 1 percent level for the actual fertility
Table 3 Ordinary least squares estimation of preferred and actual fertility (Continued)
Guangxi 0.237 (0.078)*** 0.195 (0.073)***
Guizhou 0.513 (0.070)*** 0.451 (0.063)***
Village or neighborhood population (in 1000) −0.007 (0.003)** −0.007 (0.002)***
Han nationality allowed to have two childrenif the first child is female 0.213 (0.037)*** 0.260 (0.034)***
Receiving a subsidy if having one child −0.224 (0.040)*** −0.167 (0.034)***
Urban −0.188 (0.052)*** −0.223 (0.040)***
Constant 1.226 (0.436)*** −0.906 (0.351)***
Adjusted R squared 0.240 0.324
Note: standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
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Estimation model Estimation with “Employed” as
the dependent variable
Ordinary least
squares coefficient
Probit marginal
effect
Instrumental variable
A bus stop in the village or neighborhood 0.079 (0.017)*** 0.106 (0.025)***
Other explanatory variables
Household annual income in natural log 0.019 (0.004)*** 0.041 (0.010)***
Ethnic minority (wife and/or husband) −0.064 (0.024)*** −0.100 (0.036)***
Age 0.027 (0.009)*** 0.055 (0.015)***
Age squared −0.001 (0.001)*** −0.001 (0.0002)***
Married −0.025 (0.056) −0.085 (0.102)
The first child is a son 0.007 (0.015) 0.013 (0.023)
Wife has siblings −0.025 (0.0436) −0.031 (0.072)
Husband has siblings −0.019 (0.035) −0.001 (0.055)
Smoking −0.061 (0.037)* −0.197 (0.071)**
Drinking alcohol 0.024 (0.026) 0.086 (0.044)**
Health insurance −0.014 (0.017) 0.023 (0.026)
Education
Less than primary school (reference)
Primary school 0.026 (0.024) 0.084 (0.048)***
Lower middle school 0.122 (0.023)*** 0.233 (0.041)***
Upper middle school 0.136 (0.029)*** 0.274 (0.051)***
Technologic school 0.148 (0.039)*** 0.512 (0.047)***
College 0.109 (0.041)*** 0.677 (0.023)***
Health status
Excellent (reference)
Good −0.059 (0.023)*** −0.082 (0.035)***
Fair −0.046 (0.026)* −0.053 (0.037)
Poor −0.140 (0.039)*** −0.214 (0.045)***
Province
Heilongjiang (reference)
Liaoning 0.141 (0.028)*** 0.259 (0.052)***
Jiangsu 0.309 (0.033)*** 0.444 (0.048)***
Shandong 0.204 (0.030)*** 0.354 (0.050)***
Henan 0.019 (0.023) 0.024 (0.050)
Hubei 0.152 (0.031)*** 0.236 (0.057)***
Hunan 0.032 (0.027) 0.046 (0.054)
Guangxi 0.240 (0.035)*** 0.420 (0.052)***
Guizhou 0.160 (0.030)*** 0.305 (0.057)***
Village or neighborhood population (in 1000) −0.002 (0.001)** −0.003 (0.002)
Han nationality allowed to have two children if the first
child is female
−0.033 (0.017)* −0.041 (0.027)
Receiving a subsidy if having one child 0.039 (0.019)** 0.064 (0.030)**
Urban 0.306 (0.026)*** 0.491 (0.032)***
Constant −0.507 (0.196)*** N/A
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statistically significant.
The marginal effects by Poisson estimation are reported in Table 8. Without control-
ling for endogeneity, employment reduces the preferred number of children by 0.069
and reduces the actual number of children by 0.119 – marginal effects that are very
close to those estimated by OLS (Table 3). After controlling for endogeneity with the
two-stage residual inclusion Poisson estimation, the negative effects of employment on the
preferred number of children and the actual number of children increase (in absolute value)
to 0.352 and 0.498, respectively. The marginal effects of Poisson estimation, after correcting
for endogeneity, are smaller than those estimated by two-stage least squares in Table 4,
probably reflecting the advantages of count variables estimation (since linear regressions
m a yo v e r - e s t i m a t et h et r u ee f f e c t s ) .
Results using Poisson estimations are similar to those using OLS and two-stage least
squares in terms of signs and magnitudes, and suggest that endogeneity leads to an
underestimate of the negative effects of employment status on fertility. In addition, the
included residual obtained from the first stage is positive and significant, confirming
that the employment measure is potentially endogenous (Hausman 1978; Hausman
1983; and Wooldridge 2002), and the disturbance terms of the fertility Equation (1) and
the employment Equation (2) are positively correlated. This positive correlation leads
OLS and simple Poisson regressions to underestimate the effect of employment on fertility.
Ordered probit estimations (reflecting the possibility that fertility decisions may be ordered
choices for a family) are very similar (available upon request from the authors).
Employing our preferred Poisson estimations with two-stage residual inclusion, we find
that household annual income positively affects both preferred fertility and actual fertility.
Age and age squared are good predictors for actual fertility, but not for preferred fertility.
Having a first child who is a son significantly reduces both preferred and actual fertility, as
expected given the Chinese emphasis on sons. We also find that married women with
health insurance are more likely to prefer or have more children. This may reflect that
their birth expenses or health-care costs for their children are covered by insurance, or
possibly reflect other correlates of having health insurance (such as husband’so c c u p a t i o n ) .
We also find that education reduces fertility, perhaps reflecting the differential opportunity
costs of having more children for women with greater education. Education is also
Table 4 The first stage estimation using the instrumental variable (Continued)
R squared 0.378 N/A
Tests of the first stage
1
Test of excluded instruments
F statistic 22.520 *** N/A
Underidentification tests
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 22.690 *** N/A
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic 22.960 *** N/A
Weak identification test
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic
2 22.600 * N/A
N/A not applicable.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
1 Tests are obtained using preferred number of children as the dependent variable in two-stage least squares estimation.
2 Only 10% maximal IV size of Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical value is available.
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Variables Two-stage least squares estimation
Preferred number
of children
Actual number of
children
Female employment status
Not employed (reference)
Employed −0.638 (0.437) −0.640 (0.393)*
Other explanatory variables
Household annual income in natural log 0.025 (0.013)** 0.022 (0.010)**
Ethnic minority (wife and/or husband) −0.031 (0.058) 0.010 (0.055)
Age 0.006 (0.023) 0.097 (0.020)***
Age squared 0.000 (0.0003) −0.001 (0.0003)***
Married 0.072 (0.145) 0.112 (0.132)
The first child is a son −0.112 (0.029)*** −0.098 (0.027)***
Wife has siblings 0.035 (0.082) 0.024 (0.077)
Husband has siblings 0.049 (0.070) 0.013 (0.064)
Smoking −0.119 (0.130) −0.084 (0.126)
Drinking alcohol 0.102 (0.053)* 0.043 (0.049)
Health insurance 0.061 (0.034)* 0.038 (0.032)
Education
Less than primary school (reference)
Primary school −0.124 (0.062)** −0.123 (0.057)**
Lower middle school −0.147 (0.079)* −0.143 (0.067)**
Upper middle school −0.250 (0.089)*** −0.248 (0.078)***
Technologic school −0.345 (0.104)*** −0.273 (0.088)***
College −0.277 (0.105)*** −0.263 (0.086)***
Occupation
Worker (reference)
Professional 0.235 (0.238) 0.250 (0.212)
Manager 0.199 (0.253) 0.229 (0.226)
Staff 0.221 (0.209) 0.244 (0.183)
Other occupations 0.312 (0.281) 0.327 (0.253)
Health status
Excellent (reference)
Good −0.017 (0.049) −0.073 (0.045)
Fair −0.012 (0.055) −0.079 (0.048)*
Poor −0.109 (0.103) −0.127 (0.099)
Province
Heilongjiang (reference)
Liaoning 0.229 (0.082)*** 0.193 (0.077)***
Jiangsu 0.186 (0.133) 0.148 (0.124)
Shandong 0.247 (0.109)** 0.154 (0.100)
Henan 0.565 (0.056)*** 0.484 (0.053)***
Hubei 0.371 (0.086)*** 0.324 (0.077)***
Hunan 0.404 (0.063)*** 0.227 (0.055)***
Guangxi 0.364 (0.129)*** 0.312 (0.120)***
Guizhou 0.603 (0.095)*** 0.534 (0.090)***
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woman’s occupation significantly affects fertility after controlling for employment
status. Poor health status, not surprisingly, is associated with having and preferring
fewer children. We also find that there is substantial variation in fertility among the 9
provinces, holding other factors fixed. Women living in less economically-developed
provinces (Guangxi and Guizhou) or in agriculture-intensive provinces (Henan, Hubei,
and Hunan) have and prefer to have more children.
6.4 Sensitivity analyses
We conducted various sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our results. In the first
sensitivity analysis, we examine heterogeneity by separating mothers with grown-up
children from those with young children. We divided the entire sample into two subsamples
according to the age of their youngest child. (The dividing median age of children was
16.24, an age that supports our study assumptions since 16-year-olds qualify as adults in
China). This partition lets us know whether employment status affects fertility choices
differently for women with young children compared to those with grown children. We
t h o u g h ti tu n l i k e l yt h a tw o m e nw i t ho l d e rc hildren would be likely or able to have more
children. The results show that a job (employed off the farm) significantly reduces actual
f e r t i l i t yb y0 . 1 7f o rt h o s ew o m e nw i t hy o u n gc h ildren (i.e., their youngest child is less than
16.24 years old), but had no effect on actual fertility choices of mothers whose youngest child
is already at least 16.24 years old. One potential explanation is that off-farm employment
imposes a higher cost on women with young children, compared to women with older
children. The effects of employment on the preferred number of children in these two
groups are not statistically significant (p values>0.10). Due to limited space, these sensitivity
results are omitted from the paper, but are available from the authors upon request.
In a second sensitivity analysis, we examined fertility as a binary phenomenon. The
first category contained women with 0 or 1 child, thus in accord with the most stringent
form of the one-child policy. The second category contained women with 2 or more
children. We then examined the effects of employment on this binary variable, which
essentially represents strict adherence to the one-child policy. Our results show that
employment reduces the probability of falling into the second category (and violating the
one-child policy) by 29% (p value<0.05).
7. Conclusion
Our prime finding is that off-farm employment reduces fertility for Chinese women.
Based on our Poisson estimation with two-stage residual inclusion, which controls for
Table 5 Two-stage least squares estimations (Continued)
Village or neighborhood population (in 1000) −0.007 (0.003)** −0.007 (0.002)***
Han nationality allowed to have two children if the first child is female 0.187 (0.044)*** 0.236 (0.039)***
Receiving a subsidy if having one child −0.209 (0.043)*** −0.153 (0.037)***
Urban −0.010 (0.143) −0.060 (0.129)
Constant 0.990 (0.483)** −1.122 (0.393)***
Note: standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
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Variables Poisson estimation (coefficient)
Preferred number
of children
Actual number
of children
Female employment status
Not employed (reference)
Employed −0.044 (0.026)* −0.085 (0.026)***
Other explanatory variables
Household annual income in natural log 0.008 (0.005) 0.007 (0.004)*
Ethnic minority (wife and/or husband) 0.004 (0.031) 0.033 (0.031)
Age −0.004 (0.012) 0.081 (0.012)***
Age squared 0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.0002)***
Married 0.066 (0.101) 0.088 (0.096)
The first child is a son −0.071 (0.017)*** −0.067 (0.017)***
Wife has siblings 0.041 (0.050) 0.049 (0.053)
Husband has siblings 0.038 (0.046) 0.020 (0.046)
Smoking −0.040 (0.082) −0.019 (0.080)
Drinking alcohol 0.054 (0.030)* 0.018 (0.031)
Health insurance 0.043 (0.020)** 0.032 (0.021)
Education
Less than primary school (reference)
Primary school −0.063 (0.031)** −0.057 (0.031)*
Lower middle school −0.108 (0.028)*** −0.100 (0.028)***
Upper middle school −0.177 (0.035)*** −0.179 (0.035)***
Technologic school −0.270 (0.052)*** −0.234 (0.049)***
College −0.218 (0.063)*** −0.237 (0.053)***
Occupation
Worker (reference)
Professional −0.047 (0.053) −0.011 (0.047)
Manager −0.070 (0.076) −0.028 (0.067)
Staff −0.043 (0.057) −0.026 (0.051)
Other occupations −0.023 (0.057) 0.010 (0.057)
Health status
Excellent (reference)
Good 0.016 (0.025) −0.020 (0.025)
Fair 0.014 (0.030) −0.030 (0.029)
Poor −0.015 (0.046) −0.037 (0.048)
Province
Heilongjiang (reference)
Liaoning 0.097 (0.034)*** 0.077 (0.033)**
Jiangsu 0.022 (0.039) −0.005 (0.038)
Shandong 0.096 (0.039)*** 0.039 (0.039)
Henan 0.344 (0.033)*** 0.314 (0.032)***
Hubei 0.190 (0.037)*** 0.167 (0.035)***
Hunan 0.257 (0.036)*** 0.156 (0.035)***
Guangxi 0.179 (0.048)*** 0.160 (0.049)***
Guizhou 0.330 (0.041)*** 0.311 (0.040)***
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Village or neighborhood population (in 1000) −0.006 (0.003)*** −0.007 (0.002)***
Han nationality allowed to have two children if the first child is female 0.120 (0.021)*** 0.161 (0.021)***
Receiving a subsidy if having one child −0.129 (0.023)*** −0.103 (0.022)***
Urban −0.126 (0.036)*** −0.163 (0.030)***
Constant 0.133 (0.277) −1.803 (0.271)***
Note: standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Table 7 Poisson estimations with two-stage residual inclusion
Variables Poisson estimation with two-stage
residual inclusion (coefficient)
Preferred number
of children
Actual number
of children
Female employment status
Not employed (reference)
Employed −0.230 (0.121)** −0.367 (0.120)***
Residual from the first stage 0.110 (0.068)* 0.167 (0.068)**
Other explanatory variables
Household annual income in natural log 0.013 (0.006)** 0.013 (0.005)***
Ethnic minority (wife and/or husband) −0.010 (0.033) 0.010 (0.034)
Age 0.002 (0.013) 0.089 (0.013)***
Age squared 0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.0002)***
Married 0.059 (0.103) 0.077 (0.099)
The first child is a son −0.069 (0.018)*** −0.063 (0.017)***
Wife has siblings 0.038 (0.051) 0.043 (0.053)
Husband has siblings 0.038 (0.046) 0.021 (0.046)
Smoking −0.053 (0.084) −0.039 (0.084)
Drinking alcohol 0.062 (0.034)* 0.032 (0.032)
Health insurance 0.047 (0.021)** 0.038 (0.021)*
Education
Less than primary school (reference)
Primary school −0.056 (0.032)* −0.048 (0.032)
Lower middle school −0.081 (0.033)** −0.059 (0.032)*
Upper middle school −0.145 (0.041)*** −0.131 (0.042)***
Technologic school −0.201 (0.065)*** −0.128 (0.061)**
College −0.130 (0.082) −0.104 (0.076)
Occupation
Worker (reference)
Professional −0.045 (0.054) −0.008 (0.049)
Manager −0.069 (0.077) −0.027 (0.070)
Staff −0.043 (0.057) −0.025 (0.051)
Other occupations −0.027 (0.059) 0.006 (0.057)
Health status
Excellent (reference)
Good 0.004 (0.027) −0.038 (0.028)
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sample, off-farm employment reduces the preferred number of children by 0.35 and
the actual number of children by 0.50.
Why does controlling for endogeneity yield a more powerful negative effect of employment
on fertility? We conjecture that controlling for the endogeneity of employment removes the
income and wealth effects that positively impact fertility in China,
19 while female employment
per se exerts negative substitution effects. High incomes and wealth also allow parents to pay
the penalty fines in China if they violate the one-child policy
20. Because collinearity precludes
us from including both employment and income (for females) in the same regression, the
coefficient of non-instrumented employment in c l u d e sb o t he f f e c t s ,w h i c hp u s hi no p p o s i t e
directions. Once we instrument for employment, the mitigating impact of female income
disappears, revealing the negative effect of off-farm employment on fertility. In addition, the
Table 7 Poisson estimations with two-stage residual inclusion (Continued)
Fair 0.005 (0.029) −0.043 (0.031)
Poor −0.044 (0.053) −0.080 (0.053)
Province
Heilongjiang (reference)
Liaoning 0.128 (0.040)*** 0.125 (0.039)***
Jiangsu 0.071 (0.051) 0.069 (0.051)
Shandong 0.139 (0.048)*** 0.103 (0.047)**
Henan 0.349 (0.033)*** 0.320 (0.034)***
Hubei 0.211 (0.039)*** 0.199 (0.037)***
Hunan 0.260 (0.035)*** 0.160 (0.036)***
Guangxi 0.224 (0.058)*** 0.227 (0.059)***
Guizhou 0.360 (0.046)*** 0.356 (0.045)***
Village or neighborhood population (in 1000) −0.006 (0.003)*** −0.007 (0.002)***
Han nationality allowed to have two children if the first child is female 0.112 (0.022)*** 0.150 (0.024)***
Receiving a subsidy if having one child −0.125 (0.022)*** −0.097 (0.024)***
Urban −0.051 (0.059) −0.049 (0.056)
Constant 0.032 (0.269) −1.954 (0.274)***
Note: standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Table 8 Marginal effects using Poisson estimations
Variables Marginal effect
Preferred number of children Actual number of children
Estimation model Poisson estimation
Female employment status
Not employed (reference)
Employed −0.069 (0.040)* −0.119 (0.036)***
Estimation model Poisson estimation with two-stage residual inclusion
Female employment status
Not employed (reference)
Employed −0.352 (0.165)** −0.498 (0.145)***
Residual from the first stage 0.174 (0.101)* 0.238 (0.091)***
Note: standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
Fang et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 21 of 25 2013, 2:12
http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/12effects of fertility on employment may be small. Angrist and Evans (1998) find that Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) without controlling for endogeneity overestimates the effect of fertility
on labor supply and conclude that fertility per se may have a smaller impact on female labor
supply than one might expect. The reverse causality issue in our study may not be highly
consequential, and omitted variable biases (such as those regarding female income and
employment opportunity) may dominate the endogeneity of the employment measure.
These findings provide empirical evidence regarding the economic theory of fertility and
female labor force participation. In addition, they have potentially important implications
for employment and fertility policies in China. Given the Chinese government’s ongoing
desire to curb population growth, the finding that female off-farm employment reduces
fertility has important implications. Encouraging greater rates of off-farm employment for
women could substantially reduce fertility without requiring any of the punishments and
penalties for childbearing that have earned China so much criticism. Further improvements
in women’s education would complement pro-employment policies by increasing the
productivity of employment and multiplying its fertility-reducing effects.
In sum, our study indicates that off-farm employment for Chinese women curbs both
preferred and actual fertility. Given that economic performance and population size are
two critical concerns for China, it is vital that this negative link be recognized.
Endnotes
1In the Soares and Falcao (2008) model, increasing adult longevity heightens incentives
to invest in human capital, leading to a shift toward women working outside the home and
reductions in the gender wage gap. Others have suggested several phases of demographic
transition, with fertility first increasing and then decreasing as economy-wide productivity
grows (see Lehr 2009).
2Li and Zhang (2007) provide evidence suggesting that low fertility contributed to
China’s rapid economic growth since the 1980s.
3Schultz and Zeng (1995) find that female schooling and availability of health and
family planning services significantly and negatively affect fertility in rural China.
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) find that the one-child policy lowered fertility and in-
creased the average “quality” of children; but neither set of authors analyzes female
employment behavior.
4The benefits for a couple with only one child have included health care, housing,
cash, and food subsidies (McElory and Yang 2000). Punishments for the employees of
state-owned enterprises and governments who violate the policy may involve loss of
promotion opportunities or even jobs; others are subject to cash penalties (Li and
Zhang 2009). Unpermitted babies are often not able to register their residency, nor to
obtain their identification card until these punishments are carried out. During a
particularly zealous period of enforcement in the 1980s, some areas imposed even more
draconian measures, such as forced abortions and sterilizations (Hardee-Cleaveland
and Banister 1988). Recently, policies have been changed to allow a couple whose two
members are only children to have a second child. (China Daily 2006).
5The sex ratio at birth (boy/girls) increased from 1.056 in 1982 to 1.153 in 2000. The un-
natural excessively male sex ratio at birth raises many challenges for China’ss o c i e t ya n d
economy, and many policies have been designed to ameliorate it (Li 2007). However, the
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/122010 census revealed that the problem remains acute: for every 100 newborn girls, there
are 118 newborn boys in China (Peng 2011).
6For simplicity, we assume salary s is the increment to household income that can be
attained from the woman switching from work on the farm to off-farm employment,
and that the K hours of off-farm employment cannot be combined with childcare in
the same way that work on the farm can.
7Figure 1 also shows that the cut-off line between n* =1 and n* = 2 becomes steeper
when women have better off-farm employment opportunities (access to a bus stop).
Those with the highest salary offers were already employed, but now save time in
commuting to work, and a few of them therefore switch to preferring a second child.
Thus, even in this simple model of time trade-offs, there are forces pushing in
opposite directions, and the impact of employment on fertility is an empirical
question.
8This number equals the total number of children that a woman gives birth to, minus
the number of children who have died, if any. If the woman is currently pregnant, this
future birth is also counted as part of the cumulative fertility measure, because the
current infant mortality rate in China is very low. Most women in China become preg-
nant soon after their marriage.
9Hesketh et al. (2005) find that 87 percent of married women in China use
contraception, and 25 percent of reproductive-age women have at least one abortion.
10For example, using longitudinal surveys in Anhui and Guangdong provinces,
Li et al. (2010) find that daughters’ ability to support their parents has increased,
particularly through off-farm labor including temporary migration to urban areas.
11In formulating the fertility preference question as it did, it seems clear that the CHNS
surveyors felt that the chances of women preferring to have fewer children were remote.
12See Table 1.
13We recognize that if there were a combination of three conditions – shocks to
fertility across communities unrelated to employment, fertility significantly affected
female employment, and female employment significantly influenced whether a bus
stop would be installed – our instrument would measure fertility directly, not merely
employment opportunities. This confluence of required conditions strikes us as
unlikely. Moreover, if female employment did boost bus stops, the posited instru-
mental variable relationship would be overstated. This in turn would reduce the
absolute impact of using instrumental variables compared to single-stage estima-
tion, contrary to what we find. As reported below, the IV estimates magnify the
negative effect of employment on fertility. Thus, if anything, this negative effect is
underestimated in OLS, implying the hypothetical scenario outlined in this paragraph
does not apply.
14Using the lagged instrument of bus stop availability may avoid the potential issue of
female employment affecting the setup of a bus stop in the same year. The results using
lagged bus stop existence are omitted due space limitations, but are available from the
authors upon request.
15As an additional robustness check, we replaced total household income with
household income excluding any female income in the multivariate regressions; the
results were very similar to those reported in the text.
16The marriage law in China sets a minimum legal age for women of 20 years.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/1217For example, Yao (1999) reports the female employment rate in a rural county of
Zhejiang province to be about 33 percent.
18Although fertility is higher in rural than urban areas, China’s average total fertility
per woman has remained under 2 since 1992 (McElroy and Yang 2000).
19Note that our estimate of a positive effect of income on fertility is consistent with
the conceptual model but contrasts with Schultz and Zeng (1995) and most data for
higher income countries.
20As most jobs in China are no longer in state-owned enterprises or government
agencies, administrative tools are less effective, making penalty fines more powerful
(McElroy and Yang 2000).
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